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Non-technical summary
Following a process of de-regulation and innovation in credit markets over the two decades prior to the credit crisis that started in late 2007 European banking markets became increasingly integrated and more competitive. As a result of this process, there have been stronger pressures on banks' capital and a stronger emphasis on the importance of improved efficiency in the banking sector. That is, it forced banks to operate closer to the "best practice" or efficient production function.
Our aim is, first, to assess the impact of efficiency on bank risk. In this respect low levels of efficiency could lead banks to try to boost their performance via laxer credit standards and/or less intensive monitoring of credit. In turn, we will also have to consider if changes in bank risk have an influence on their efficiency levels. For instance, increases in bank risk may temporally precede a decline in cost efficiency related to lower credit screening.
Second, we aim to assess the impact of bank capital on the risk and efficiency trade-offs. Namely the relationship between efficiency and risk might be affected by the level of capital particularly in light of the decline of overall bank capital (as a proportion of total loans) at the macroeconomic level. For instance, moral hazard problems might increase incentives of thinly capitalized banks to augment their level of risk thereby incurring higher non-performing loans in the future.
To tackle these questions, we build on previous literature and asses the inter-temporal relationships between bank risk, efficiency and capital levels. 2 We use a large data set of European Union commercial banks from 26 European Union countries (EU-26) ranging from 1995 to 2007.
We use Granger-causality methods (Berger and De Young 1997, Williams 2004 ) in a panel data framework. Our model delves in the relationship between these factors by including several definitions of bank efficiency (i.e. cost, revenue and profit efficiency scores), risk (i.e. nonperforming loans and probability of default) and capital (i.e. core equity and total capital).
In general, our results show that subdued bank efficiency (cost or revenue) Granger causes higher risk supporting the "bad management" hypothesis. We also show that increases in bank capital precede cost efficiency improvements suggesting that moral hazard incentives appear to fall as bank capital increases. Cost (and profit) efficiencies are also found to positively Granger-cause bank capital. In other words more efficient banks seem to eventually become more capitalized and higher capital also tend to have a positive effect on efficiency levels.
Overall we believe our results to be particularly interesting from a prudential supervisory perspective. The findings showing that low efficiency scores can harbinger future banking problems and that efficiency improvements tend to shore up banks' capital positions could be useful from a policy perspective. They emphasize the importance of attaining long-term efficiency gains also to support financial stability objectives. 2 We focus on bank risk-taking, efficiency and capital level since these factors are free of measurement errors. Regarding the bank competition, there are various measures available (Goddard and Wilson, 2009 ), but it is still debated which one is the most accurate (Carbo et al., 2009 ).
Introduction
Over the last two decades prior to the credit crisis that started in late 2007, European banking markets became increasingly integrated. The twin forces of deregulation and technological change contributed to the progressive process of financial integration and increased competition in the financial services industry (ECB, 2010) . 3 As a result of this process, there has been a tremendous emphasis on the importance of improved efficiency in the banking sector. That is, it has forced banks to operate closer to the "best practice" or efficient production function. At the same time, this increase in competition could -at least in the short term -lead to greater (and possibly excessive) risk-taking. This is because increased competition reduces the market power of banks thereby decreasing their charter value. The decline in banks´ charter values coupled with the banks' limited liability and the existence of 'quasi' flat rate deposit insurance could encourage banks to take on more risk (Matutes and Vives, 2000 and Salas and Saurina, 2003) . 4 Regulators have tried to counterbalance these possible incentives by giving capital adequacy a more prominent role in the prudential regulatory process.
5
In this environment a number of studies have focused on the impact of capital (Repullo, 2004; Allen et al., 2009; Gropp and Heider, 2010) , operating efficiency (Casu and Girardone, 2009a ) and business models (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010) on bank risk. 3 See Goddard et al (2007) . 4 This issue is not undisputed; Boyd and Nicolo (2005) argue that the theoretical foundations linking more competition with increased incentives towards bank risk-taking are fragile. See Carletti and Hartmann (2002) for a useful survey of the literature linking competition and stability. 5 For instance, in the aftermath of the introduction of the euro, Vives (2000, pg. 15) 
already argued that 'the general trend is to introduce competition in banking and to check risk-taking with capital requirements and appropriate supervision'.
6 A parallel literature has analysed the impact of bank competition on banks' risk and efficiency (e.g. Boyd and De Nicolo, 2003; De Nicolo et al., 2008 , Cihak, Schaeck and Wolfe, 2009 , Casu and Girardone, 2009 ).
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June 2010 Surprisingly, there are only a limited number of studies that assess inter-temporal relationships between bank risk, capital and efficiency. The recent credit crisis has highlighted the need for further understanding of the determinants of bank risk in an environment of enhanced bank efficiency and lower bank capital (Haldane and Alessandri, 2009).
Our aim is, first, to assess the impact of efficiency on bank risk. In this respect low levels of efficiency could lead banks to try to boost their performance via laxer standards and/or less intensive monitoring of credit. 7 In turn, we will also have to consider if changes in bank risk have an influence on efficiency levels. For instance, increases in bank risk may temporally precede a decline in cost efficiency related to lower credit screening.
Second, we aim to assess the impact of bank capital on risk and efficiency trade-offs.
Namely, the relationship between efficiency and risk might be affected by the level of capital particularly in light of a decline in overall bank capital (as a proportion of total loans) at the macroeconomic level. For instance, moral hazard problems might increase incentives of thinly capitalized banks to augment their level of risk thereby incurring higher nonperforming loans in the future. Similarly, highly capitalized banks may be subject to lower moral hazard problems and may be both more efficient and prudent than thinly capitalized institutions. Conversely, as capital is costly highly capitalized banks may, on average, increase their level of risk to maximize revenues.
To tackle these questions, we build on previous literature and assess the intertemporal relationships between bank risk, efficiency and capital levels. We use a large data set of banks from 26 European Union countries (EU-26) ranging from 1995 to 2007. Our main variables of interest include both forward and backward-looking measures of bank risk, several measures of bank capital and three bank efficiency measures (revenue, cost and profit efficiencies). 7 See section 3 for a detailed description of the main hypotheses.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 includes a literature review while section 3 presents the main hypotheses of interest. The model specification, variables and data are explained in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 discusses the empirical results, section 7 presents the robustness checks and section 8 concludes.
Related literature
Bankruptcies in the financial sector are costly, not only for banks' equity and debt holders but often also for taxpayers. As a result the study of the determinants of banks' risk and, in particular, of the effectiveness of forcing banks to hold a certain amount of capital (to buttress bank stability) has a long history. An early line of US research on risk-taking incentives examined the effects of capital regulations (e.g. Peltzman, 1970 or Mayne, 1972 .
8
The main concern of these early studies was to analyse the effectiveness of financial regulation and, especially, to consider whether the existence of a flat-rate deposit insurance scheme (i.e. not linked to banks' risk) created incentives for excessive risk. Overall, results from these earlier studies were sceptical about the effectiveness of banking capital regulation influencing banks' soundness (see Marcus, 1983) .
The introduction of the 1988 Basel Accord on international bank capital standards (Basel I) reignited interest on the effectiveness of bank capital regulations. A new wave of studies (mostly for the US banking sector) 9 tended to find that regulatory capital constraints were buttressing banks' capital (e.g. Wall and Peterson, 1987 and Dahl and Shrieves, 1990 ).
In the aftermath of the Basel I application and subsequent amendments, the interest on the effects of capital adequacy regulations on banks´ risk persisted. For instance, Ediz et al., (1997) found that bank capital regulation had been effective in increasing capital ratios 8 Most of these earlier approaches build on Friedman's (1962) capital adjustment model. 9 One exception is Barrios and Blanco (2003) .
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June 2010 without substantially shifting bank portfolios and off-balance-sheet (OBS) exposures towards riskier assets in the US and UK. In this direction also, Demsetz et al., (1996) and Salas and Saurina (2003) found that banks with lower capital tended to operate with higher levels of credit risk in line with the moral hazard hypothesis.
In parallel, and depending on the focus and modelling strategy, the theoretical literature offers contradictory results as to the effects of capital requirements on bank risktaking incentives (see Berger et al., 1995; Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Santos, 1999; Boot et al., 1998) . Overall then, the issue of whether higher capital ratios reduce overall banking risk has remained largely unresolved.
A major contribution to the debate came from Hughes and Mester (1998, 2009 ) who argued for the need to consider bank efficiency when analysing the relationship between capital and risk. According to Hughes and Mester (1998, 2009 ) both capital and risk are likely to be determined by the level of bank efficiency. For instance, supervisory authorities may allow efficient banks (with high quality management) a greater flexibility in terms of their capital leverage or overall risk profile, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, a less efficient bank with low capital may be tempted to take on higher risk to compensate for lost returns due to moral hazard considerations.
In this line Berger and De Young (1997) and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) for the first time the data also covers the period of monetary union that has led to radical changes in the European financial system increasing banks' pressures towards operate more efficiently (Goddard et al., 2007, Bos and Schmiedel, 2007 
Research hypotheses
Before introducing the empirical model and building on previous studies, we posit the major research hypotheses about the inter-temporal relationship between bank risk, capital and efficiency building on Berger and DeYoung (1997) operating with low levels of efficiency have higher costs largely due to inadequate credit monitoring and inefficient control of operating expenses (which is reflected in lower cost efficiency almost immediately). Declines in cost (and revenue) efficiency will temporally precede increases in banks' risk due to credit, operational, market and reputational problems.
The "cost skimping" hypothesis assumes that there is a trade-off between short-term cost efficiency and future risk-taking due to moral hazard considerations. In such cases, banks appear to be more cost efficient as they devote fewer resources to credit screening and monitoring. As a result the stock of non-performing loans remains unaffected in the short run.
In the medium term however, banks reach higher risk levels as they have to purchase the additional inputs necessary to administer future higher risks. In the case of revenue efficiency, higher levels of short-term profits are normally obtained at the cost of laxer credit screening. This will also normally result in higher future risks. In other words, a bank may be tempted to increase revenues simply by taking on higher risks to compensate for lost returns.
The "bad luck" hypothesis is related to the consequences of increases in bank risk on efficiency levels. It argues that external exogenous events (e.g., unexpected shocks) can precipitate increases in problem loans for the bank unrelated to managers' skills or their risktaking appetite. These increases in risk result in additional costs and managerial effort. Thus, under this hypothesis, we expect increases in bank risk to precede falls in cost and revenue efficiency.
The 'moral hazard' hypothesis suggests a negative causal relationship between capital and risk pointing out that bank managers have incentives to take on more risk particularly when the level of bank capital is low (or banks are more inefficient). The moral hazard hypothesis could arise in the presence of informational frictions and the existence of relevant
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June 2010 'agency problems' between bank managers and owners (see Gorton and Rosen, 1995) . A traditional moral hazard problem being when managers take-on risks that are borne entirely by the shareholders. 12 Better capitalised banks, in contrast, have less moral hazard incentives (Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005) and are more prone to adopt careful practices to reduce costs (e.g. shareholders may be more active in controlling bank costs or capital allocation).
Regulators can also force banks to increase the amount of capital commensurably with the amount of risk taken (Gropp and Heider, 2010) . Holding additional capital buffers above the regulatory minimum for banks with higher levels of risk aims to avoid the costs associated with having to issue fresh equity at short notice (Ayuso et al., 2004; Peura and Keppo, 2006) .
As indicated by Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), banks could also respond to regulatory actions forcing them to hold more capital by increasing portfolio risk.
Methodology
We rely on Granger-Causality techniques to investigate the relationship between bank risk, capital and efficiency as this approach allows us to test unique time-ordered and signed relationships among pairs of variables. Bank managers may also have incentives to exploit flat rate deposit insurance schemes.
13 Granger's (1969, p. 428 ) notion of causality states that "… y t is causing x t if we are better able to predict x t using all available information than if the information apart from y t had been used". Granger's suggestion to regress x t on its own lags and a set of lagged y t has become a standard procedure. If lagged y t provides a statistically significant explanation of x t , y t "Granger" causes x t .
14 Granger-testing does not prove economic causation between two variables but identifies gross statistical associations. In order to disentangle the inter-temporal relationships between bank capital, efficiency and risk we estimate the following equations:
14
where the i subscript denotes the cross-sectional dimension across banks, t denotes the time dimension, Risk is the variable accounting for bank's risk, X-EFF and τ-EFF are the cost and revenue efficiency scores respectively. E/TA is the equity to total asset ratio while Z (j=1,…,4) are control variables including factors influencing the efficiency-capital-risk relationship and e i,t is the random error term. The variable definitions are summarized in analyze Granger causality as the joint test that the two lags of each of the determinants is distributed as a chi-square (χ 2 ) with two degrees of freedom. If the probability is less than 10%, then the null hypothesis that x does not Granger-cause y is rejected at the 10% significance level. We also assess the 'long-run effect' of x over the y by testing for the restriction that the sum of all lagged coefficients is zero: a rejection of the restriction implies that there is evidence of a long-run effect of x on y.
Various problems arise in the estimation of such a model. 16 The introduction of a lagged dependent variable among the predictors creates complications in the estimation as the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the disturbance (even under the assumption that 
Variables and data
Measurement error can be one of the main problems encountered when assessing bank risk and efficiency. As bank risk is a crucial measure in our analysis we try to capture its main dimensions by using two major measures: the 5-year ahead cumulative Expected Default Frequency (EDF) for each bank calculated by Moody's KMV and the traditional nonperforming loans to total loans ratio NPL\L. The EDF is a forward-looking measure and refers to the expected probability of default within the short-term (1-year ahead) accounting for all banks' risks (i.e. not only credit risk (Santos, 1999, Diamond and Rajan, 2000) .
As a robustness check, we also use a narrower definition of bank capital defined as the core value of equity to total assets (E A /TA).
We build on the previous literature to control for other factors that may influence the relationship between capital, risk and efficiency. Namely, we include a set of controls Mean cost-and revenue-efficiencies range between 37% and 59%, whereas the average EDF are slightly lower than 1% while non-performing loans are less than 3.5% of total bank loans.
Non-interest income accounts, on average, for 20% of net operating income whereas total loans are, on average, around 78% of total bank assets. Correlation among the variables is usually negligible suggesting that our models are unlikely to suffer from major multicollinearity problems.
25 21 These two measures are found to be negatively correlated, but the magnitude of the Pearson correlation coefficient (i.e. -0.5027) suggest no serious multicollineary problems. 22 Due to the specialist offshore business of Luxembourg banks these were excluded from the sample. 23 We focus on this time period since data prior to 1995 (especially on the EDF) is often not available and after 2007 the implementation of the Basel II capital accord might have complicated the interpretation of the relationships. Overall, it has to be borne in mind that for most of this period credit risk has been at relatively benign levels. 24 As defined by Bankscope. 
Results
We report the results from models (1)-(4) using two lags on equity capital, cost efficiency, revenue efficiency and bank risk in table 3, where bank risk is measured using EDF (i.e. the 1-year ahead expected default frequency), the EDF 5Y (i.e. the 5-year ahead expected default frequency) and the NPL/L (i.e. the ratio of non-performing to total loans).
<<INSERT We show that the capital ratio (E/TA) is found to positively Granger-cause cost efficiencies (x-eff) (statistically significant at 5% or less) in all the model (2) estimations (i.e.
y=x-eff in table 3). Namely, an increase in the sum of the lagged capital ratio coefficients temporally precede cost efficiency increases although there is no impact on risk. This suggests that moral hazard incentives appear to fall as bank capital increases and these banks are more likely to reduce costs (e.g. shareholder may be more active in controlling bank costs or capital allocation) than thinly capitalised banks. These conclusions are independent from the bank risk measure adopted in estimating model (2): namely, the long-run positive causation effect between capital and cost efficiency is found in all models using different definitions of bank risk (i.e. EDF, EDF 5Y , NPL/L). We also find a positive statistically significant (at the 1% level) link between cost efficiency and the number of credit institutions (NCI) suggesting that cost efficiency levels are positively linked to the number of competitors in the market (supporting the view that competition makes banks more cost effective). We also find a negative statistically significant (at the 5% level or less) link between cost efficiency and income diversification (ID) suggesting that more specialised banks benefit from scale and learning economies that enable them to reduce costs more than their diversified counterparts. These conclusions are also independent from the bank risk measure adopted.
We also show that the cost efficiency indicator (x-eff) is found to positively Grangercause bank's capital (E/TA) (statistically significant at 10% or less) in all the models (4) estimations ( We also find a positive statistically significant (at the 1% level) link between the capital ratio and the number of credit institutions (NCI) tentatively suggesting that high capital levels are positively linked to the number of competitors in the market (so supporting the view that bank competition might encourage higher equity capital levels).
Surprisingly and unlike most of the previous literature we find no strong causal relationship between capital and risk (when measured using EDF or EDF 5Y ) for our period of study. There is however evidence of positive bi-directional Granger causality when NPL/L is our risk measure. This suggests that capital is more likely to be related to past credit risks than broader-based (future) banking risks.
Robustness tests
In order to confirm the validity of the aforementioned findings, we conducted a number of robustness checks. Firstly, we calculate the equity ratio in a standard accounting way (E A /TA) by focussing on the book value of total equity (rather than the Basel Committee capital definition) and we re-estimate models (1) to (4). As in We also find evidence that profit efficiency negatively Granger-causes (at the 10% confidence level) bank's EDF or NPL/L in the model (1) estimations. As in Table 3 we also find a bi-directional causal relationship between capital and NPL/L.
<<INSERT TABLE 5 >>
Thirdly, we re-estimate equations (1)-(4) positing a AR(4) lag structure for bank risk, capital and efficiency. This change has substantial effects on our sample composition by reducing the number of bank observations from 1,987 to 667. As shown in table 6, the AR(4) specification cannot be safely assumed since longer lags may be weak instruments. As expected, test statistics are found to be insignificant at three and four lags and, overall, we find little evidence to support the claim that causal relationships exist (in the long run) beyond a single or two-lag (i.e. two years) period.
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Conclusions
We assess the inter-temporal relationships among bank efficiency, capital and risk for the European commercial banking industry. We build on previous work using Granger-causality methods (Berger and De Young 1997, Williams 2004 ) in a panel data framework. Our model delves into the relationships by including several definitions of bank efficiency (i.e. cost, revenue and profit efficiency scores), risk (i.e. non-performing loans and probability of default) and capital (i.e. core equity and total capital).
In general, our results show that subdued bank efficiency (cost or revenue) Granger causes risk supporting the "bad management" and the "efficiency version of the moral hazard" hypotheses. We also show that increases in bank capital precede cost efficiency improvements suggesting that moral hazard incentives appear to fall as bank capital increases. Better capitalized banks are more likely to reduce their costs compared to their thinly capitalized counterparts. Cost (and profit) efficiencies are also found to positively Granger-cause bank capital. In other words more efficient banks seem to eventually become better capitalized and higher capital levels also tend to have a positive effect on efficiency levels.
We find only limited evidence of relationships between capital and risk in line with the moral hazard hypothesis. The main finding seems to be a bi-directional causal link between capital and our accounting measure of risk (NPL/L). There is little evidence of any strong causal link between capital (total capital or equity capital) and our market-based bank risk indicators.
Overall we believe our results to be particularly interesting from a prudential Non Performing Loans NPL/L Non-performing loans over the total gross value of total bank loans.
( 1) 1-Year Ahead Expected Default Frequency™ EDF Probability that a company (bank) will default within a year.
5-Years Ahead Expected Default Frequency™

EDF 5Y
Cumulative probability that a company (bank) will default within 5 years.
Capital to Asset Ratio E/TA Value of total equity divided by total assets. Equity capital is measured focusing on the Basel Committee definition of capital by summing total equity, retained earnings, general banking risk reserves, other equity reserves, hybrid capital instruments and subordinated debts.
(
Book value of Capital to Asset Ratio E A /TA Total equity divided by total assets. Equity capital is measured by the book value of total equity.
Income Diversification ID Net non-interest income to net operating income.
Bank Asset Size BAS BAS is the Euro value of its total assets.
(1) Domestic Banking Industry Concentration CONC Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
Number of Credit Institutions NCI NCI is the number of credit institutions.
Interest Rate IR 3-month money market interest rate.
GDP Per-capita Ln(GDPP) Natural logarithm of the domestic GDP (in Euro) divided by the number of inhabitants.
GDP Annual Growth Rate GDPG Domestic GDP growth rate between two consecutive years.
Population Density Ln(POPD) Natural logarithm of the number of inhabitants per Km. Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model ( 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 Observations Note: We use the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer (20005) corrected standard error (reported in brackets). The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The variables Risktotal , x-efftotal , ⎮ -efftotal and E/Atotal are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of lagged terms (for the bank risk-taking, the cost efficiency, the revenue efficiency and the equity-asset ratio variables, respectively) is equal to zero. A significance level lower than 10% enables to reject the null hypothesis of no causality from the x to the y. A coefficient greater than zero show a positive causation from the x to the y; a coefficient smaller than zero show a negative causation from the x to the y. The Sargan/Hensen test of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators: the null hypothesis is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is that errors in the first difference regression do not exhibit second order serial correlation. (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model ( 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 Observations The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The variables Risktotal , x-efftotal , ⎮ -efftotal and E/Atotal are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of lagged terms (for the bank risk-taking, the cost efficiency, the revenue efficiency and the equity-asset ratio variables, respectively) is equal to zero. A significance level lower than 10% enables to reject the null hypothesis of no causality from the x to the y.
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A coefficient greater than zero shows a positive causation from the x to the y; a coefficient smaller than zero shows a negative causation from the x to the y. The Hensen test of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators: the null hypothesis is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is that errors in the first difference regression do not exhibit second order serial correlation.
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June 2010 (5) Model (4) Model (1) Model (5) Model (4) Model (1) Model (5) Model ( 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 Observations The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
The variables Risktotal , π-efftotal and E/Atotal are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of lagged terms (for the bank risk-taking, the profit efficiency and the equityasset ratio variables, respectively) is equal to zero. A significance level lower than 10% enables to reject the null hypothesis of no causality from the x to the y.
A coefficient greater than zero shows a positive causation from the x to the y; a coefficient smaller than zero shows a negative causation from the x to the y. The Hensen test of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators: the null hypothesis is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is that errors in the first difference regression do not exhibit second order serial correlation. 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 Observations The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The variables Risktotal , , x-efftotal , ⎮ -efftotal and E/Atotal are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of the four lagged terms (for the bank risk-taking, the profit efficiency and the equity-asset ratio variables, respectively) is equal to zero. A significance level lower than 10% enables to reject the null hypothesis of no causality from the x to the y.
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June 2010 Bank inputs and outputs are defined according to the value-added approach, originally proposed by Berger and Humphrey (1992) . We posit that labour, physical capital and financial capital are inputs 28 , whereas demand deposits (y 1 ), total loans (y 2 ) and other earning assets (y 3 ) are outputs 29 . We also estimate the alternative revenue efficiency measures: in this "alternative" approach, banks take input and output quantities as given and we selected these measures since prices are often inaccurately measured in banking. 30 The revenue efficiency is estimated using the same translog functional model adopted for the cost efficiency, by using as dependent variable the total bank's revenue in the revenue function. The bank input and output definition adopted is the same adopted to estimate the cost efficiency.
28 Input prices are obtained as total personnel expenses over total assets (w 1 ) , total depreciation and other capital expenses over total fixed assets (w 2 ) and total interest rate expenses over total funds (w 3 ). 29 This selection of inputs and outputs follows the studies by Sathye (2001) and Dietsch and Lozano (2000) , Aly et al. (1990) and Hancock (1986) , wherein the author develops a methodology based on user costs to determine the outputs and inputs of a banking firm. Although off-balance sheet (OBS) items may play a role in generating bank value-added, we omit to consider OBS items since our sample also includes small banks that do not have OBS items or data are not available in the Bankscope database. By including the OBS in the output selection, the sample size would have been substantially reduced, especially because we use a AR(3) process in model (1).
30 Berger and Mester (1997, p. 904) notes that "if prices are inaccurately measured -as is likely, given the available banking data -the predicted part of the standard profit function would explain less of the variance of profits and yield more error in the estimation of the efficiency terms ln u  . In this event, it may be appropriate to try specifying other variables in the profit function that might yield a better fit, such as the output quantity vector, y, as in the alternative profit function".
